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Abstract 
 
Many advanced economies around the world have recently witnessed a notable rise in populism 
stirring severe political unrest and social instability. This paper addresses the apparent 
academic confusion regarding the origins of this phenomenon and combines politico-economic 
analysis with electoral data to derive a new theory of populist demand. I conceptualise populism 
as a problem of political alienation stemming from the incapacity of social democratic parties to 
comprehensively represent the working class in the context of increased labour market 
dualisation. If the group of underrepresented workers is not sufficiently numerous to be 
electorally-relevant, right-wing populist protest parties can make use of the representational 
vacuum by reframing class-distributional issues along cultural conflict lines. If, however, the 
group of marginalised workers is large enough to mobilise political attention, left-wing populist 
parties will address socio-economic issues more directly. I thus assume an inverted hyperbolic 
causal relationship between labour market segmentation and the demand for populism. This 
hypothesis is tested in a critical case study on the electoral effects of labour market reforms in 
Germany and Spain. 
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The Political Economy of European Populism:  
Labour Market Dualisation and Protest Voting in 
Germany and Spain 
 
 
Introduction 
Without a doubt, the widespread surge of populist parties constitutes one of 
the most topical political issues within the European Union in recent years, 
creating intense insecurity and reasonable doubt about the future stability of 
the partnership. While European populism is certainly no peripheral 
phenomenon anymore, academic discourse is still dominated by great 
disagreement as to the origins and explanations of its multifarious 
manifestations in national politics. In fact, ‘[t]he mercurial nature of populism 
has often exasperated those attempting to take it seriously’ (Stanley, 2008: 108) 
and seemingly prevented the formulation of an encompassing theory of 
populism (Müller, 2016). Definitions and the derivation of powerful 
explanatory variables remain rather vague focusing on a variety of issues from 
economic deprivation to a conservative-nostalgic backlash against progressive 
value change and loss of cultural identity. What is more, in public discourse 
this conceptual confusion tends to turn the notion into a merely polemical 
battle cry imposing the risk of being labelled ‘populist’ on any media-effective 
politician (Bale et al., 2011: 121).  
This study adds substance to the academic debate by exploring the origins of 
different forms of European populism from a politico-economic perspective. 
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 2 
Recent findings suggest that right-wing populism and protectionist demands 
should emerge in societies subject to large-scale immigration with a large 
number of economically deprived voters, or rather ‘losers of globalization’ 
(Kriesi et al., 2006; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Interestingly, comparing the 
cases of Germany and Spain, these expectations do not necessarily materialise. 
Posing the question why Germany struggles under the lasting influence of the 
right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) while Spain 
produced a left-wing movement, I propose that right-wing populism is a 
consequence of intense dualisation in labour markets, which leads to political 
disregard of outsider interests by social democratic parties (Rueda, 2007: 221).  
 
The Argument in a Nutshell 
In this paper, I find that the widespread surge of European populism during 
the last decade coincides with an unprecedented collapse of support for social 
democratic parties, especially by workers as their classical, core constituency 
(Rhodes, 2013: 141). This suggests that populism might be regarded as an issue 
of political under-representation where increasingly alienated voters became 
prone to right-wing populist demands.  
This assumption is supported by partisanship theory. Increasing dualisation, 
describing the differential treatment of protected labour market insiders and 
marginalised outsiders, has changed the structures of policy preferences within 
the labour class in industrialised economies. Social democratic parties that used 
to be able to represent a homogenous class of workers with one coherent set of 
policies must now decide which of the often-opposing interests of their former 
core constituency to cater and which to disregard (Häusermann, 2010), often to 
the detriment of the ‘weakest members of society’ (Rueda, 2007: 3).  
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Against this theoretical backdrop, I show that the likelihood for a rise of right-
wing populism depends on the relative number of marginalised working-class 
voters as a result of widened labour market segregation, their mobilising 
capacity, and above all the generalisability of their experience of socio-
economic decline. This number of outsiders must be large enough to electorally 
enable the successful rise of a protest party, but must, however, remain small 
enough for office-seeking social democrats to neglect these interests as 
irrelevant for election outcomes. I operationalise this hypothesis in a critical 
case study of labour market reforms in Germany and Spain.  
While the motives and aims of the German and Spanish labour market reforms 
appear largely similar in targeting structural unemployment problems, their 
outcomes could not be more different. The German Hartz reforms of 2003-05 
significantly reduced employment protection legislation (EPL) for temporary 
workers in sheltered service sectors, who consequently had to take the brunt of 
internal wage adjustment. Macro-economically, Germany could thereby 
increase its wage competitiveness and, in combination with its export-led 
growth model, achieve remarkable macro-economic success. However, the 
reforms split the labour market and effectively distinguished between 
protected insiders and marginalised outsiders (Hassel, 2011).  
The Spanish reforms of 2010 and 2012 addressed poor economic performance 
by reducing EPL for permanent employees. But the reforms did not improve 
internal flexibility as seen in Germany where wages and hours worked were 
reduced. Here, the reforms led to external flexibility, namely further reductions 
in both temporary and permanent employment. While GDP did not recover 
effectively, considerably large parts of the population were made worse off 
(Horwitz and Myant, 2015).  
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These very different outcomes have important implications for the potential of 
populist political mobilisation. In Germany, targeted labour market dualisation 
paired with macro-economic strength and low levels of unemployment created 
a group of outsiders that lacked a collective experience of socio-economic 
decline and hence, crucial mobilisation capacity. 1  These voters remained 
under-represented until AfD eventually occupied electoral space on the left 
addressing former social democratic clientele. In Spain, the failed labour 
market reforms created a significantly large group of socio-economic ‘losers’. 
Consequently, the reforms led to the mobilisation of open protest in form of a 
grassroots movement and the birth of new left-wing populist party Podemos.  
The relevance of this study lies in its theoretical approach connecting valuable 
insights from comparative political economy with electoral research (Kitschelt, 
1999: 318). As Häusermann (2010: 1) illustrates, ‘[b]oth fields […] have 
developed rather separately and there is only limited exchange of theories and 
results’. After all, the significance of politico-economic institutions, and 
especially labour market dualism, for voting behaviour has largely been 
neglected (Lindvall and Rueda, 2013: 461). A conjunction of these theory 
strands is necessary to disentangle the legitimate appeals of protest voters from 
the illiberal features of populist demands. Furthermore, German AfD has only 
rarely received attention in studies, because until the general elections of 2017 
the party could celebrate success only in regional polls. As a result, 
international academic discourse does not usually connect Germany with a 
strong surge in right-wing populism (e.g. Wolf, 2017) – unjustifiably so, as will 
be shown.  
                                                 
 1  It is thus not entirely surprising that right-wing populist leaders often like to call their 
constituency (in empirically inaccurate terms) the ‘silent majority’. 
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The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, I review the academic 
literature and define the central terms. Then, I present the underlying puzzle 
to explain my choice of cases. In the third section, I establish the theoretical 
background and my hypothesis for explaining the differing emergence of 
populism in Germany and Spain, which is then tested in a critical case study. I 
construct my argument in two logical steps: First, I examine the politico-
economic effects of major labour market policies in both countries. Then, I 
connect these findings to actual voting behaviour to test whether those 
negatively affected constitute significant parts of protest parties’ constituency. 
I close with a conclusion of my findings and a political outlook.  
 
Debating Populism 
As indicated above, populism constitutes a very misty concept. A precise 
definition is therefore of outmost importance. Margaret Canovan (1999: 3) 
classically defines populism as ‘an appeal to “the people” against both the 
established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the 
society’. In this line of thought, the term ‘populism’ is generally associated with 
anti-establishment attitudes motivated by negative feelings like anger, 
frustration and resentment. Hence, profound anti-elitism, that is, defending the 
“volonté générale (general will)” of a large number of ‘ordinary people’ against 
a corrupt elite, often seems to be not only a necessary, but also a sufficient 
condition for frequently-stressed, wide definitions of populism (Mudde, 2004: 
543). However, the explanatory power of such attempts suffers severely from 
their notorious vagueness for one could argue that it is the reasonable aim of 
any politician seeking office to appeal to a maximum number of (ordinary) 
people and distinguishing her position from the ruling elite. In this broad sense, 
any political opposition could be defined as populist. At the same time, the 
simultaneous emergence of left-wing and right-wing populism exemplifies 
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that the ‘ideological features attach[ed] to populism depend upon the socio-
political context within which the populist actors mobilize’ (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2011: 2). After all, it seems in a way a cuckoo can lay an egg in any 
nest, populists can claim any type of policy their own. This makes a clear-cut 
definition along ideologies and attitudes almost impossible. 
Jan-Werner Müller (2016) suggests a more precise conceptualisation. Holding 
that anti-elitism is a necessary but nevertheless insufficient feature of populism, 
he adds the notion of anti-pluralism to the equation. In this view, populists are 
distinguished by a holistic conception of a homogenous, pure will of the 
people, which must be defended against political elites and social outsiders 
alike (cf. Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). While this adds an important 
normative spin to the conception, in its narrowness it also risks describing 
political strategies natural to generic radical right-wing parties. What seems to 
distinguish modern populists from the classical radical right, however, is the 
lack of a clear-cut ideological project of a desired future. At the same time, they 
reject certain elements of liberal democracy, but not necessarily the system 
itself (Kaltwasser, 2014). The supposed ‘will of the people’ is empirically not 
observable and political solutions offered are merely short-term and usually 
unconstructive (Acemoglu et al., 2013: 772). From this standpoint, populists 
derive their most characteristic feature: regaining political agency to remedy 
the political frustration of an allegedly silent majority of neglected voters 
(White, 2017).  
Against this background, my narrow definition of populism requires three 
necessary components: anti-elitism, anti-pluralism, and the pivotal demand of 
regaining political agency. This structural definition has special charm, because 
it allows to map and explain appeal to populist parties without having to call 
such voters necessarily populist in their orientation. Populism, in this sense, is 
not first and foremost about ideology and policy content, but about regaining 
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agency for allegedly underrepresented parts of society (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2013). This narrow conception allows to qualitatively distinguish 
between different kinds of populist movements (Gidron and Bonikowski, 
2013). 
What are the relevant independent variables explaining European populism? 
Academic discourse distinguishes broadly between three explanatory variables 
for the demand in European populism, all connected to the overarching 
concept of globalisation: progressive value change and immigration, economic 
distress and crises, and social regression and anomy.  
Proponents of the ‘cultural backlash thesis’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; 
Goodwin, 2011) hold that populist support can be explained as a nostalgic 
reaction by once-predominant parts of the population to progressive value 
change and increased immigration. Different studies show that anti-immigrant 
sentiments and holistic conceptions of national identities stir cultural conflicts 
and support the rise of populist movements (Hainmüller and Hiscox, 2007; 
Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). Sudden increases in the local share of 
immigrants can hence lead to an increase of the voting share of such parties, 
typically among older and less-educated white men (Halla et al., 2017).   
Contrary to this supposition, others stress economic reasons as the original 
source of radical voting. Economic crises lead to increased unemployment, 
reduced wages, stalling growth rates and deprivation, which stirs 
dissatisfaction and radicalisation (Funke et al., 2015). Formulating the crisis 
thesis more broadly, supporters of radical parties are primarily ‘losers’ of 
economic modernisation and structural changes in the political economy of 
advanced industrial societies, such as automation and de-industrialisation. 
Putting this experience in relation to social peers or their own past, those 
affected develop radicalising feelings of relative deprivation (Vlandas and 
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Halikiopoulou, 2015: 640). However, such rather broad assumptions do not 
always withstand empirical enquiries. For example, Vlandas and 
Halikiopoulou (2016: 24) show that economic downturns per se do not 
necessarily lead to radical voting. Rather, the specification of protective labour 
market institutions cushions the adverse political consequences of crises: 
‘Where […] [labour market] institutions are less generous, the risks and costs 
of unemployment are greater and the far right is more likely to increase its 
support.’ Deregulation of employment protection and the reduction of benefits 
for parts of the working population increase dualisation and undermine the 
protective capacities of labour market institutions. 
Finally, some sociologists and political economists recently emphasised social 
regression and anomy to explain the increased demand of populist voting 
(Rydgren, 2007: 247). Wolfgang Streeck (2017: 6) argues that populism 
originates in the inherent conflict of democratic capitalism. During the last 
decades, neoliberalism became the ‘pensée unique of both the centre left and the 
centre right’, promoting liberalisation, marketization, and increased 
competitiveness at the cost of the weakest members of society. The erosion of 
standard employment (Dörre, 2006), the retrenchment of social services, the 
intensification of casualisation, and the shrinking of the middle class supported 
the lingering feeling of social anomy among significant parts of a disintegrated 
society, which eventually culminated in the radical political expression of 
protest and frustration (Nachtwey, 2016).  
The findings of my study support a combination of the two latter theses, 
particularly the relative deprivation approach (Runciman, 1966), and I consider 
globalisation an important external force prompting dualising labour market 
reforms. Finally, I assume that voting behaviour is primarily determined by 
economic interests, particularly by the individual positioning in the labour 
market (Lindvall and Rueda, 2014: 462).  
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Method 
Recent findings suggest that right-wing populism and protectionist demands 
should emerge in societies subject to large-scale immigration with many 
economically-deprived voters, or rather ‘losers’ of globalisation. But why then 
do reactionary political movements develop such different characteristics 
across Europe? This puzzle becomes particularly striking comparing the 
curious cases of Germany and Spain. 
Germany seems to outperform Spain in almost any relevant economic 
indicator. Most importantly, it has navigated through the crisis very smoothly, 
displays remarkable levels of economic competitiveness promoting a very 
successful exporting industry, and registers record-low levels of 
unemployment. In contrast, the Spanish economy was among the most 
severely hit by the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, which prompted the 
government to impose profound austerity packages. Large parts of society 
were negatively affected when poverty rates, inequality and especially (youth) 
unemployment increased significantly. Cultural and social data seem to 
indicate a similar pattern. Over the past ten years, Spain experienced stronger 
increases of net migration per capita than Germany2 and is characterised by a 
particularly high share of foreign-born population compared to EU-average. 
Distribution is more unequal and poverty rates are higher, not least due to 
effects of the crisis and the exceptional levels of unemployment. Finally, the 
Spanish population perceives its political and economic elites as significantly 
more corrupt. 
 
 
                                                 
 2 Admittedly, German net migration surged quite suddenly during the refugee crisis. However, AfD was successful well before that capitalising on an anti-Euro course during the debt crisis and won most votes in those regions that received fewest refugees. 
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Table 1 Juxtaposition of Germany and Spain (mean values, 2006-2016) 
Indicator Germany Spain Difference 
Economy 
GDP growth (nominal; in %) 1.5 0.7 -0.8 
Investment growth (gross fixed capital 
formation; in %) 1.9 -1.8 -3.7 
Long-term interest rates (in %) 2.3 3.9 +1.6 
Unemployment (total; in %) 6.5 18.6 +12.1 
Youth unemployment (total in %) 9.4 40.0 +30.6 
Exports (goods and services; % of GDP) 43.9 28.6 -15.3 
Current account balance (total; % of GDP) 6.7 -3.1 -9.8 
Household debt (total, % of net disposable 
income) 89.0 140.9 +51.9 
Government debt (% of GDP) 77.4 81.0 +3.6 
Government debt growth (total; percentage 
points) 9.7 71.5 +61.8 
Credit rating (S&P; July 2017) AAA BBB+  
Culture and Society 
Permanent immigrant inflows  
(per 1000 inhabitants) 3.78 7.24 +3.46 
Foreign population (% of population) 8.5 11.7 +3.2 
Foreign-born population 
(% of population) 12.9 13.8 +0.9 
Poverty rate 0.089 0.147 +0.058 
Poverty gap 0.24 0.36 +0.12 
Inequality (gini coefficient) 0.29 0.34 +0.05 
Inequality (P90/P10 diposable income ratio) 3.56 5.0 +1.44 
Austerity (package of 2011; % of GDP per 
head)* 0.4 3.1 +2.7 
Perception of corruption (CPI; 100 = no 
corruption)** 79.5 62.2 -17.3 Source: OECD (2017a); *Gainsbury et al. (2011); **Transparency International (2017); own calculations. 
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And yet, against most academic expectations Germany struggles under the 
lasting success of right-wing populist party AfD, while Spain remains a 
counterintuitive exception. While the AfD shows clear indications of far-right 
populism (Lewandosky et al., 2016), pro-European Podemos around its leader 
Pablo Iglesias formulated a left-wing populist response to economic 
predicament.  
From this curious academic puzzle, I derive my research question: Why did a 
resilient political economy such as Germany produce demand for a right-wing 
populist party, while crisis-shaken Spain generated a successful and less 
radicalised left-wing reaction? 
I examine this question in the framework of a critical case study. Along the lines 
of Gerring’s (2007: 232) seminal methodology of comparative research, both 
countries represent ‘crucial’ cases. I argue that Spain is a most-likely case, since 
it ‘is one that, on all dimensions except the dimension of theoretical interest, is 
predicted to achieve a certain outcome and yet does not. It is therefore 
disconfirmatory.’ Germany, on the other hand, is a case that many scholars 
would predict not to produce right-wing populism and yet it does so. Hence, 
Germany constitutes a ‘least-likely’ case (see also Hancké, 2009: 60-85; Eckstein, 
1975). Combining these critical cases, I formulate an alternative explanation for 
the differing demand of populist parties in Europe focusing more closely on 
the electoral consequences of labour market dualisation and political under-
representation of outsiders. In the following section, I present my theoretical 
approach and hypothesis in more detail. 
 
Dualisation and the Crisis of the Left 
An interesting observation constitutes the starting point to my theoretical 
approach. At a glance, the latest populist upsurge coincides with a pertinent 
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crisis of social democracy observable in many EU member states since the mid-
2000s.3 Their support has collapsed in unprecedented dimensions, in fact, since 
2006 by a third in domestic and European elections (Economist, 2017). 
Academically, these developments put in question the traditional politico-
economic assumption that a relatively homogenous working class will support 
social democratic parties that rally for high employment and generous welfare 
states (Hibbs, 1977). On the contrary, social democrats recently have become 
subject to severe competition from radical populist alternatives as ‘workers and 
low-income voters more generally increasingly desert left-wing parties’ 
(Häusermann, 2010: 6). In terms of their voter potential, political representation 
by populists and the classic left appears to large extents substitutional and 
social democrats face most difficulties in political environments where socio-
economic inequalities are increasingly determined by differential access to 
stable occupations and protective welfare services (Rhodes, 2013: 146).  
Building on this, I argue that the crisis of the left can be explained with the 
formation of institutional dualisation as suggested by partisanship theory. 
Dualisation ‘is a process that is characterized by the differential treatment of 
insiders and outsiders’ (Emmenegger et al., 2012: 10). In this sense, insiders may 
be defined as ‘employed full-time with a permanent job or as those with part-
time or fixed-term jobs  who do not want a full-time or permanent job 
[including] individuals with permanent contracts (defined as not having a time 
limit)’, while outsiders ‘are unemployed, employed full-time in fixed-term and 
temporary jobs (unless they do not want a permanent job), employed part time 
(unless they do not want a full-time job), and studying’ (Rueda, 2005: 63). 
                                                 
 3 It is important to note, however, that populism is by no means exclusively a phenomenon of the 2000s, as the second wave of radical right mobilisation took place with the initial rise of the French 
Front National in the 1980s. Nevertheless, today’s rise of populism appears to be much more encompassing and vigorous both, in political as well as media terms. 
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Insiders thus profit from high labour market protection, whereas outsiders are 
increasingly marginalised and precariously employed with low salaries and 
restricted, often means-tested social security entitlements. Consequentially, 
labour appears to be dividable into two distinct segments with very different, 
often opposing policy preferences. While insiders demand ever-increasing job 
protection to contain competition, outsiders require generous unemployment 
benefits and access to stable employment.  
This has profound political implications. On the supply side, heterogeneous 
interests within labour create a dilemma for social democratic parties in terms 
of who’s demands to cater. As a result, they serve insiders as their electorally 
more relevant core constituency and often neglect the interests of outsiders 
(Rueda, 2007). Increased protection of core labour against the adverse 
implications of globalised economies is literally ‘bought’ at the expense of 
marginalised outsiders, who take the brunt of flexibilisation efforts (Thelen, 
2014: 151). This form of targeted marginalisation is the prime reason why we 
observe stagnant or even rising levels of poverty despite reduced 
unemployment numbers across European economies (Cantillon, 2011) and 
hints to a structural under-representation of significant parts of society. On the 
demand side, many voters neglected by traditional agents of fringe labour 
interests turn away from mainstream options to populist alternatives that 
promise to regain political agency and voice (see Rueda, 2005: 72). In this light, 
I consider populism essentially a ‘political alienation problem’ (King and 
Rueda, 2008). 
For my hypothesis, I formulate the theory of labour market dualisation as an 
optimisation problem. The likelihood of a demand for right-wing populism 
depends on the number of marginalised working-class voters and, 
consequentially, on the generalisability of their experience of socio-economic 
predicament. If the group of labour market outsiders is small, opposing 
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interests among labour do not pose a problem for social-democratic 
representation, there is no frustrated group of underrepresented voters and no 
breeding ground for populism. If, however, the outsider group is medium-
sized, a dualisation problem for social democratic representation emerges, 
because interests within labour diverge significantly. Far-right populists can 
likely make use of the representational vacuum by reframing economic issues 
in cultural terms. Lastly, if the group of marginalised labour is large enough to 
regain political attention and is not neglected as politically irrelevant outsiders, 
left-wing parties will represent them and right-wing populism becomes, again, 
unlikely. Hence, I suppose as my hypothesis an inverted U-shape causal 
relationship between labour market segmentation and the demand for 
populism (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Politico-Economic Model of Populism 
 
In this model, the scope for right-wing populism depends on a significant 
number of dissatisfied protest voters as a result of dualisation, and 
consequentially, on the inability of social democrats (and their social partners) 
Likelihood of  
right-wing populism 
Number of marginalised 
outsiders in working class 
Shaded area:  high likelihood of right-wing populism due to sizable, but electorally irrelevant number of likely-to-be neglected voters. 
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to address and represent significant parts of labour, deserting crucial electoral 
space.  
In the next section, I operationalise my hypothesis in a critical case study 
framework. The central question of that section is: What implications did 
flexibilising labour markets in Germany and Spain have in terms of 
dualisation? This will help to examine how labour market reforms might have 
steered differing demand for populism. To assess the generalisability of socio-
economic decline, it is particularly important to relate the intensity of 
dualisation to the overall performance of the economy, since political discourse 
in resilient economies is commonly dominated by an emphasis on general 
economic success that tends to disregard deeper-lying social issues (cf. 
Nachtwey, 2016).  
 
Labour Market Reforms in Germany and Spain 
Although both reform efforts in question were more than seven years apart, 
they share striking similarities in terms of their approach and objectives. Both 
economies struggled under structural unemployment. While German labour 
markets were severely affected by the oil crisis and reunification efforts, Spain 
was among the most severely hit by the European financial crisis experiencing 
one of the largest falls in employment. The concordant diagnosis of many 
observers of the time was a lack of economic competitiveness in an increasingly 
globalised market environment and the inefficiency of public institutions that 
led to structural deficits and low performance. Hence, both countries 
implemented comprehensive labour market reforms aimed at increased 
flexibility. In fact, Spain even found an example in Germany’s reforms, which 
due to its initial macro-economic success many experts prescribed to struggling 
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peripheral member states. However, the outcomes of the reform efforts were 
very different. 
  
Germany: The Hartz-Reforms of 2003-2005 
Germany is widely admired for its economic performance during the post-war 
‘Golden Age’ of growth. Its success is commonly attributed to a specific set of 
productive institutions, such as sustained employment protection and social 
insurance that allowed for overcoming coordination problems between labour 
and capital, facilitated social partnership, and produced remarkable growth 
rates (Eichengreen, 2008).  
However, at the turn of the millennium concerns grew over the resilience of the 
German economy in the eye of increasingly globalised competition.  In January 
2002, it became public that the Federal Employment Agency had manipulated 
figures regarding successful employment placement, which led to severe 
distrust in the efficiency of the German public sector. As a result, chancellor 
Schröder tasked a corporatist commission of high-ranking representatives of 
leading unions and business associations, presided by Peter Hartz, working 
director of Volkswagen, with producing policy proposals to reform the labour 
markets and the social system. The results were implemented by a coalition of 
social democratic SPD and the Green party between 2003 and 2005 (Hassel and 
Schiller, 2010). 
First and foremost, the four-packet reforms aimed at reducing the staggering 
unemployment numbers by flexibilising the labour market. Hartz III 
deregulated temporary work, encouraged part-time employment and 
introduced a marginal low-pay mini-job scheme that was exempt from social 
contributions. Job-seekers also faced sanctions for rejecting ‘reasonable’ job 
offers. Most importantly, however, Hartz IV cut the duration of more generous, 
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earnings-related unemployment benefits from 36 to 12 months and replaced 
social welfare schemes (Sozialhilfe) with reduced, means-tested benefits (Martin 
and Swank, 2012: 211ff.; Lunz, 2013: 18). These activating supply-side measures 
stressed self-responsibility and aimed at strengthening firms’ exporting 
competitiveness by reducing public charges and incidental wage costs 
(Immervoll, 2007). 
The effects of the reforms are as multifaceted as they are divisive. Proponents 
of the activation policies see them as the single most important cause for the 
reinvigoration of the German economy in the mid-2000s (Rinne and 
Zimmermann, 2012). And indeed, Germany significantly improved the 
robustness of its economy and achieved remarkable trade surpluses shortly 
after the crisis. In contrast, however, an ever-growing number of critics put the 
success of the reforms into question (Dustmann et al., 2014). Criticism focuses 
particularly on the dualising effects of the reforms. While labour markets were 
not deregulated wholesale, they opened the door for the comprehensive 
creation of low-pay marginal work (Palier and Thelen, 2010). The reforms were 
clearly geared towards protecting Germany’s core labour, who’s interests 
remained strongly represented in work councils and manufacturing unions. In 
fact, Germany constitutes a very rare case where EPL for regular employees 
increased since 1985 (Thelen, 2014: 131). In turn, fringe labour had to shoulder 
the brunt of liberalisation efforts. Comprehensive outsourcing and the 
introduction of temporary and subcontracted labour excluded many, 
particularly low-wage service employees from collective bargaining coverage 
(Odendahl, 2017: 12). EPL for temporary employment was dramatically 
reduced. So, while the reforms arguably improved Germany’s macro-economic 
performance, its post-war corporatist model lost ‘the capacity […] to be 
encompassing and to cover all citizens under one type of work contract and 
social protection’ (Palier and Thelen, 2010: 139). 
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Empirically, this is particularly observable in the growth of atypical forms of 
employment (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Different Forms of Employment in Germany, 1996-2010 (1996=100) 
 Sources: ILO (2017; 2016); German Federal Statistical Office (2017a; 2017b); OECD (2017d); own calculations following Eichhorst (2012: 9). 
While unemployment sank to record-low numbers after the implementation of 
the reforms, this was only possible through the extensive creation of marginal 
jobs. In contrast, the number of standard employment contracts has stagnated 
since 1996. Insofar, in the eye of severe cost pressures, Germany decided to 
ensure general employment growth at the expense of wage equality (Iversen 
and Wren, 1998). The creation of so-called ‘mini-jobs’ is a particular problem 
and ‘one of the most important sources of dualization’ (Thelen, 2014: 134) as 
these employment relationships do neither entitle to unemployment and 
pension benefits (Buschoff and Protsch, 2008: 61ff.), nor do they promise a 
transition to permanent employment (Bäcker, 2006). In addition, many mini-
jobbers are also often so-called Aufstocker (‘top-uppers’). These workers top-up 
insufficient low-wage earnings with state-financed minimum income support. 
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This way, ‘over a quarter of recipients of Hartz IV support are working, but for 
wages that are so low that they also qualify for means-tested benefits’ (Thelen, 
2014: 139) – an arrangement that severely jeopardises the dignity of work 
(Sandel, 2017). Hence, it is safe to conclude that the Hartz reforms did flexibilise 
the labour markets and improved the resilience of the overall economy, but 
necessary real wage restrains were achieved mostly by the bottom deciles of 
the income distribution (Odendahl, 2017: 13).  
Figure 3.  The Effects of Labour Market Reforms in Germany and Spain 
    Sources: OECD (2017b; 2017c); own calculations. 
So, in Germany, the labour market reforms developed very divisive outcomes. 
While they were successful in terms of aggregate national indicators, they also 
proved highly segmenting and socially dualising (see Figure 3). After all, the 
reforms ‘institutionalize[d] and anchor[ed] a divide between well-protected 
standard employment relationships endowed with significant benefits on one 
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hand, and more precarious jobs with virtually no benefits on the other’ (Thelen, 
2014: 140).  
The outcomes of the German reforms prove not only economically, but also 
politically disastrous to the weakest and most affected parts of society. The fact 
that the reforms significantly improved employment numbers and are often 
referred to as the most important reason for Germany’s resilience during the 
European crisis makes a collective experience of their empirically measurable 
socio-economic predicament effectively impossible. Instead, this feeling 
remains rather latent leading to a subliminal sentiment of irrelevance and fear 
of relative social decline (Burkhardt et al., 2013), while public discourse is 
dominated by a macro-economic success story. In this setting, the weakest parts 
of labour lack crucial mobilisation capacity, which makes the political demands 
of marginalised outsiders less relevant to social democratic parties (Pontusson 
and Rueda, 2010: 699). Under these specific circumstances, it is thus reasonable 
to assume that those shouldering the brunt of adverse reform effects abandon 
‘centrist social democratic parties and [make] their votes available for populist 
left and right-wing parties instead’ (Rhodes, 2013: 147).    
 
Spain: The Royal Decrees of 2010 and 2012 
Spain implemented its two major labour market reforms only in 2010 (Royal 
Decree 10/2010) and 2012 (Royal Decree 3/2012). However, the motives 
coincided with Germany’s ambitions. The financial crisis of 2008 had put great 
pressure on Spain’s labour markets and unemployment rates were among the 
highest in Europe. Here as well, the initialising structural reforms of 2010 were 
implemented by a socialist government (Zapatero) and aimed at increasing 
internal flexibility. Additional reforms were introduced in the two years 
thereafter, however, the reforms under consideration were the trigger for 
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comprehensive political protest in form of the 15-M movement and the 
subsequent foundation of Podemos.   
The reforms focused on three broad areas: collective bargaining, promotion of 
permanent contracts, and employment protection (see OECD, 2013). The 
reforms of 2010 decentralised collective bargaining, and the reforms of 2012 
introduced the possibility to opt-out of collective agreements and effectively 
prioritised firm-level agreements. Most importantly, the reforms significantly 
reduced dismissal costs by redefining fair dismissal statutes, reducing 
compensation for unfair dismissals from 45 to 33 days, and extending the trial 
period for new workers in smaller enterprises from six months to one year. 
Interestingly, these policies affected disproportionally permanent workers, 
who after the 2010 reforms could be fairly released ‘merely […] by the inclusion 
of explicitly economic, organisational, technical and production-related 
reasons’ (Horwitz and Myant, 2015: 8). Furthermore, the reforms gave 
employers the right to ‘unilateral changes to working conditions, such as 
working hours or wages’ (Horwitz and Myant, 2015: 6) and thus, starkly 
affected workers’ living standards and security. While constraining collective 
bargaining and employment protection both legislations actively promoted 
fixed-term contracts. Between 2012 and 2014, on average more than 90 percent 
of newly issued contracts were temporary (Horwitz and Myant, 2015: 23).  
The combination of these measures intended to flexibilise the labour markets 
and adjust working hours and wages in economic downturns to prevent 
dismissals. The result, however, looked very different (see Figure 3). Reduced 
demand and output, due to both, externally-imposed austerity and 
comprehensive wage cuts, led to quick and strong reductions in employment. 
This indicates that in contrast to the German story, when restrictions were 
loosened companies immediately took the chance to lay off permanent workers 
rather than sharing working hours or increasing part-time work to prevent 
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dismissals. Hence, in the context of Spain’s domestic demand-led growth 
model, the reforms led to external flexibility instead of desired internal 
devaluation (Horwitz and Myant, 2015: 31).  
Within no time, the reforms destroyed an estimated 630,000 jobs, 66 percent of 
which were qualified open-ended contracts. Between 2011 and 2013, Spain 
witnessed a loss of 1.7 million full-time jobs (Lago Peñas, 2013: 11), while 
temporary contracts increased by 31.2 percent and involuntary part-time work 
by 27 percent during the same period (Unión General de Trabajadores, 2014: 
13, 24). So, while the reforms effectively increased the power of capital, they led 
to a significant reduction in qualified open-ended employment and a 
substantial weakening of insider positions. At the same time, ‘temporary 
workers appear to have been penalised twice’: while they were also target of 
comprehensive dismissals, their earnings deteriorated due to the newly 
implemented possibility of re-negotiating wages once fixed-term contracts 
expired (Orsini, 2014: 7). Under these circumstances, ‘the reality [of the Spanish 
reforms] is […] a parallel worsening of conditions for both permanent and temporary 
employees’ (Horwitz and Myant, 2015: 27; emphasis added).  
This outcome, of course, constitutes a striking difference to the German case 
where the reforms marginalised parts of labour, but ultimately protected the 
core leaving many better off due to lower prices of services, higher export 
competitiveness, and robust economic growth. The fact that in Spain large parts 
of society were afflicted by the reforms and the effects were further amplified 
by pro-cyclical austerity created a generalisable experience of socio-economic 
hardship. Mobilisation capacity was collectively strengthened by leading trade 
unions who had been involved initially in the reform process, but soon rejected 
the planned measures and called for fierce opposition, mass demonstrations 
and strikes across the country (Clauwaert and Schömann, 2012). Unlike in 
Germany, failed social dialogue thus united trade union resistance and created 
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a political environment in which a left-wing populist party could address 
uniformly the interests of a large group of increasingly marginalised 
individuals.  
In conclusion, the comparison of German and Spanish labour market reforms 
exemplifies the various outcomes that similar reform efforts can produce. 
While in the context of the German political economy with its export-led 
growth model, internal flexibility could be achieved at the cost of fringe labour 
and with the partial support of leading manufacturing unions, in the Spanish 
domestic demand-led growth model liberalisation led to external flexibility 
and uncontrollable increases in unemployment affecting both, insiders and 
outsiders. In the next section, I integrate this politico-economic analysis with 
electoral data to examine the very different political implications of liberalising 
labour market reforms with respect to my inverse hyperbolic model of 
populism. 
 
Political Consequences in Germany and Spain 
In the classical politico-economic conception, labour often used to organise 
effectively a collective class-struggle to improve their socio-economic situation. 
Nowadays, however, with targeted dualisation becoming the reform of choice 
in most advanced economies, it is increasingly difficult to collectively align 
interests. This development prompted some scholars to hint to the adverse 
implications that under-represented outsiders could have for political stability 
and social cohesion by turning to more radical party options (cf. Esping-
Andersen, 1999). Rather than organising a collective class-struggle along 
economic issues, workers who feel isolated, politically weak and neglected turn 
to their cultural peers and become susceptive to right-wing populist ideology 
(Bornschier, 2010). But while dualisation is observable in most modern 
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capitalist democracies, political consequences can look very differently. With 
regards to my inverse U-shaped model, I suppose that in Germany dualised 
and underrepresented workers will constitute a target for right-wing populists, 
while in Spain the number of marginalised insiders and outsiders is large 
enough to effectively mobilise a left-wing populist reaction. 
 
Germany: Right-Wing Populism and the AfD 
Collective action has become increasingly difficult for politically alienated 
labour (King and Rueda, 2008). Where partisanship is declining and class 
consciousness is low, cultural politics emerge, focusing on ‘ethnic, religious, or 
linguistic’ similarities (Hechter, 2004: 427). In this view, if labour markets are 
increasingly dualised, class politics weaken because no collective experience of 
socio-economic predicament can be established. Those parts of the working 
class who do feel the calamities of liberalisation cannot turn to their often-
better-off class peers, but turn to cultural politics in search for support. On the 
supply side, right-wing populists can exploit this transition and effectively 
‘distract […] from economic issues’ by provoking cultural conflicts 
(Häusermann, 2010: 7). This is precisely observable in Germany since 2013. 
As argued in the previous section, the German Hartz reforms led to stark 
dualisation in the labour market while at the same time increasing the strength 
of the German economy. Against this backdrop, their political consequences 
were many-faceted and protracted. Initially, the party DIE LINKE (the left) was 
founded as an immediate reaction to the Hartz reforms by merging the 
Schröder-opposing left wing of SPD around Oscar Lafontaine with Gregor 
Gysi’s former GDR party PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism). However, the 
party never achieved convincing momentum, both, due to the initial macro-
economic success of the reforms and their perceived necessity, and its 
undeniable historical connection to the dictatorial party of the GDR, the SED. 
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In addition, Germany’s manufacturing and service unions were hopelessly 
divided and thus unable to organise class-based collective action. In the 
corporatist setting of the Hartz commission, manufacturing unions 
representing insiders (such as IG Metall) supported dualisation as a means for 
improved wage restraint and cheaper services for their members. On the other 
hand, low-wage services are traditionally difficult to unionise and their 
representative bodies (e.g. ver.di) had to stand and watch after demonstrations 
of up to 200,000 could not be turned into sustained political opposition (Thelen, 
2014: 140).  
Only ten years later, a party could occupy persistently the deserted space on 
the left side of the political spectrum – not by offering corresponding policies, 
but by attracting the respective clientele. Quite interestingly, it was a right-
wing populist party that with its anti-elitist and anti-pluralist discourse 
(Lewandowky et al., 2016) could make labour market outsiders an essential 
part of their constituency. Recent electoral data on the transformation of the 
German party landscape supports this view (Figure 4).  
In 2000, during the heyday of modern German social democracy, 44 percent of 
workers voted for the SPD. Only sixteen years later, this number plummeted 
to 17 percent. At the same time, the share of well-educated employees voting 
for the party increased by 20 percent clearly reflecting SPD’s move towards the 
centre. While this spectacular drop in workers’ support for the former labour 
party can be explained partially by the overall decline of workers’ share in the 
total population, the effect remains far above-average strong (Sauer, 2017). In 
turn, the AfD gains remarkable support in that spectrum. In fact, in 2016 the 
party united 34 percent of workers and most employees performing mundane 
job activities as their constituency (Figure 5). The share of unemployed and 
low-income self-employed voters is also much higher than average. Finally, 
AfD supporters show low incomes in relation to hours worked per week and 
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are significantly more dissatisfied with the economic situation (Brenke and 
Kritikos, 2017: 596-603). These measures indicate that the AfD has, in fact, 
developed into a new German labour party supported to important extents by 
marginalised outsiders that suffered from SPD’s dualisation dilemma.  
Figure 4. Transformation of Electoral Support Structures of German Parties, 2000 and 2016 
 Sources: Brenke and Kritikos (2017: 599); own figure. 
Figure 5.  Party Preference in Germany by Job Activity in 2016 (excl. apprentices) 
 Source: Brenke and Kritikos (2017: 598); own figure. 
But why is it precisely a right-wing populist party that could make use of the 
representational vacuum on the left? After all, they do not offer constructive 
solutions to actual socio-economic problems their supporters experience. In 
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fact, AfD follows a free-market liberal agenda and deliberately demands 
incentives for taking up low-paid employment and fighting abuses of the 
welfare system (AfD, 2017). This agenda likely even worsens the socio-
economic situation of large parts of its supporters. Why then do marginalised 
outsiders support the AfD?  
Protest vote theory offers an answer. Protest voters, as a reaction to political 
disregard by mainstream parties, deliberately support those parties that do not 
embody their actual interests or values and those that are not fully established 
or ostracized. In this sense, protest voters do not necessarily vote for right-wing 
populists by conviction, but rather to commit a publicly-effective breach of 
taboo (Arzheimer, 2008: 108) ‘hoping that its electoral success might urge the 
actually preferred party to return to addressing their needs’ (Lengfeld, 2017: 
215; own translation). This demand-side explanation is supported by data that 
finds that in all state elections in 2016 on average only 25 percent of supporters 
voted AfD by conviction, while 67 percent indicated to have voted out of 
disenchantment with other parties (Tagesschau, 2017). At the same time, a 
recent study finds that AfD-supporters are connected by an unspecified fear of 
(intergenerational) social regression and loss of control, particularly in the job 
environment, which leads to a broad but subliminal feeling of insufficient 
representation. 41% of AfD-supporters see themselves as ‘losers of societal 
development’ and 67% are worried about their personal future, particularly 
with regards to job security and financial protection.4 Very importantly, the 
study also indicates a lack of generalisability of these individual perceptions as 
73% of all Germans assess the overall economic situation as ‘good’ or ‘very 
good’ (Hilmer et al., 2017: 12, 14, 28). Taken together, this data clearly supports 
the assumption that electoral underrepresentation of outsiders stirred 
                                                 
 4 These numbers are 14 and 20 percentage points above average. 
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dissatisfaction and created a window of opportunity for an unconstructive but 
nevertheless impactful right-wing reaction.  
On the supply-side, the AfD exploited these currents by reframing ‘economic 
conflicts in cultural terms’ (Grande and Kriesi, 2012: 16), particularly during 
the refugee crisis. Since no collective experience of socio-economic hardship 
was palpable, by over-emphasising cultural conflict lines the AfD could forge 
a union between dissatisfied and underrepresented outsiders and more 
affluent, but equally fearful middle-class voters to become a relevant force in 
the German political spectrum. After all, populist protest was framed along the 
discourse of migration and labour competition, abuse of the welfare system, 
and internal security, but not along the lines of socio-economic decline and 
marginalisation.  
 
Spain: Left-Wing Protest Movements and Podemos 
In Spain, the labour market reforms produced very different political 
outcomes. The most immediate reaction to the debilitating measures was the 
Movimiento 15-M, a bottom-up protest movement that united hundreds of 
thousands of ‘Indignados’ (“Outraged”) in demonstrations across the country 
in May 2011. The central motivation of 15-M was to protest the two-party 
system of the conservative Partido Popular and the social-democratic PSOE 
allegedly cooperating to reinforce the cumbering dominance of capitalism over 
democracy. This suspicion found its most pertinent expression in the reforms 
of 2010 and 2012. Thus, the protests addressed specifically the restructuring of 
the labour market and the comprehensive austerity programmes (Evans, 2015: 
36). Drawing on the wide-spread perception of economic deficiency and 
mismanagement, the movement ‘re-politicized “common sense” in a specific 
direction’ (Sola and Rendueles, 2017: 4) and created ‘mobilizing capacity, 
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visibility and impact […]  [that] had no precedent in the country’s recent 
history’ (Romanos, 2016: 131). 
The movement gained political stamina in form of Podemos, a left-wing populist 
party with crowd-funded resources and decentralised organisation in local 
groups that appeared ready to capitalise on the social outrage that was 
channelled through 15-M. Many of Podemos’ leading figures had important 
roles in the movement and led the party to remarkable success. After it 
achieved 8% in the European elections in 2014, it rose to 22.2% in the local 
elections of May 2015 becoming the second strongest party behind the 
conservative PP and before the socialist PSOE to effectively shake up the 
Spanish two-party system.  
But why did the failed labour market reforms and economic mismanagement 
produce a distinctive left-wing reaction? Again, a differentiated look at the 
electoral support structure of Podemos provides an answer. The Spanish crisis 
of representation that provided a window of opportunity for Podemos opened 
for two coinciding reasons: economically, the labour market reform failures led 
to a ‘twice pessimistic evaluation’ of the national and the individual economic 
situation of many. Politically, this reinforced the existing notion of corruption 
and adverse collusion between the two central parties and capital (Bosch and 
Durán, 2017: 10). Podemos reacted with a ‘neo-Keynesian’ agenda as a direct 
answer to the neo-liberal labour market policies (Iglesias, 2015).  
As expected, Podemos is able to appeal to an exceptionally broad social bloc 
(see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6.  
Podemos’ Vote by Occupational Class and Economic Position  
 
Source: Sola and Rendueles (2017: 11). 
The party unites voters from very different occupational backgrounds, making 
it ‘quite transversal among the service class, non-manual workers, and skilled 
and unskilled workers (four approximately equal groups that together represent 
80% of the population)’ (Sola and Rendueles, 2017: 12; emphasis added). In 
addition, they are very successful among students subject to youth 
unemployment, the unemployed and permanent and temporary workers alike. 
The party managed to channel the political support of economically 
disadvantaged parts of society, and very importantly those who feel as such. 
Mobilising this specific clientele ‘eager to punish the PSOE at the polls’ 
(Zarzalejos, 2017: 189), Podemos made use of the crisis of Spanish social 
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democracy. By uniting a broad range of voters who all suffered from economic 
marginalisation, the party could quickly evolve into a cross-cutting political 
force with a left-wing agenda.  
But is Podemos populist? As mentioned above, the term ‘populism’ witnesses 
inflationary use in modern-day public discourse. It is thus no surprise that 
many political opponents and academic observers label the protest party 
accordingly. And indeed, most political observers agree that Podemos does 
establish a moralising and monist discourse that puts the interests of an 
underrepresented populus against a politically mismanaging elite (cf. 
Kioupkiolis, 2016). However, unlike AfD, Podemos neither shows elements of 
xenophobia or cultural chauvinism nor clear-cut anti-pluralist sentiments. On 
the contrary, the party seems to accomplish a repolitisation of social and 
distributional conflicts by adopting political appeal in real-life experiences. 
Conceptionally, it is thus important to note that on the right half of the inverted 
hyperbolic model presented in this paper the political atmosphere is much 
more charged than on the left half, and economic predicament and political 
underrepresentation naturally lead to an increasingly populist discourse. 
However, the decisive (normative) difference between populist outcomes lies 
in the reasonable addressing of empirically observable socio-economic issues 
such as unemployment, casualization, and low pay as opposed to the 
unjustified artificial creation of substitutional cultural conflict lines at the cost 
of minorities.  
In conclusion, although in both countries an increasing number of voters felt 
abandoned and economically and politically deprived due to the effects of very 
similar labour market reforms, protest was channelled in very different ways. 
These findings support my inverted hyperbolic model of populism. A large 
number of marginalised outsiders were addressed by a left-wing movement in 
Spain, while a smaller number of relatively deprived workers remained 
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unrepresented until a far-right populist party forged an electorally-relevant 
coalition by reframing the discourse along an anti-pluralist agenda in 
Germany. For the appraisal of the respective labour market reforms, this results 
in an interesting paradox: labour market reforms can create successful and 
resilient economies and yet stir severe political unrest and social instability, 
while the consequences of failed efforts may also be radicalising, but politically 
and culturally less detrimental in general. 
 
Limitations 
Of course, this inquiry is not without limitations. Populism is a very elusive 
concept with manifold and versatile independent social, political and cultural 
variables. This complicates data accessibility and makes it very challenging to 
establish causal relationships to explain social developments that may well 
simmer under the surface for many years until they suddenly gain political 
momentum.  
Regarding the German case, I explicitly do not focus on ideological 
motivations, but rather derive cultural cleavages from socio-economic 
inequalities. While this approach helps to formulate a theory that may well 
explain electorally-relevant parts of populist demand it can of course not 
explain support in its entirety. There are certainly right-wing populist 
supporters who draw their motivation not from economic marginalisation, but 
from blatant xenophobia, prejudice, and unjustified fears. This makes rejecting 
the ‘cultural backlash thesis’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Goodwin, 2011) 
admittedly more difficult than perhaps suggested. However, drawing on 
protest vote theory, this inquiry demonstrates yet again that economic 
predicament is a necessary precondition to cultural conflicts. Analysing AfD’s 
support structure it is safe to say that the party could most probably not be 
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successful if it drew its support exclusively from a xenophobic far-right 
electorate.  
Regarding the Spanish case, scientific studies propose a variety of other 
important variables that could explain the absence of a successful radical right-
wing party. Firstly, the recent history under Francisco Franco’s dictatorship is 
an often-cited source of Spain’s imperturbable Europhilia and the virtual 
absence of the radical right. Many voters witnessed Spanish fascism and are 
very mistrustful when radical parties try to establish a nationalist discourse 
(González-Enríquez, 2017: 30). Secondly, Spain’s electoral system favours large 
parties by applying the D’Hondt formula to assign parliamentary seats 
proportionally to the number of votes received. ‘[C]ombined with a very large 
number of electoral districts of differing sizes, [this] creates a kind of 
majoritarian rule in each province which tends to keep small national parties 
out of Parliament’ (González-Enríquez, 2017: 33). The extreme fragmentation 
of the Spanish radical right (Democracia Nacional, España-2000, and Plataforma 
per Catalunya) makes success in this environment evermore unlikely (Alonso 
and Kaltwasser, 2015). While these objections are certainly worth to consider, 
my approach nonetheless does not only offer a stringent explanation for the 
absence of a Spanish right-wing party, but also a compelling argument for the 
particular establishment of a left-wing populist movement. After all, Podemos 
faced the same institutional obstacles and still was successful, specifically 
because it mobilises support based upon a generalisable experience of socio-
economic deficiency.  
Finally, the timing of the reforms produces the perhaps most fundamental 
limitation. Unfortunately, it is impossible to separate analytically the political 
effects of the two central elements of Spanish shock therapy – labour market 
reforms and austerity. This raises the important question of the counterfactual: 
What if Spain had implemented its deregulating measures earlier under more 
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favourable economic conditions? Addressing this in detail would go beyond 
the scope of this work. However, the labour market reforms were certainly not 
independent of the economic downturn as they led to increased 
unemployment and loss of domestic demand. Consequently, they might have 
had very similar effects even without amplifying austerity.  
 
Conclusion 
Summing up, by connecting politico-economic analysis with empirical 
electoral insights this paper offers a new approach to understanding European 
populism. Populist demand can be conceptualised in an inverse hyperbolic 
model where a medium-sized group of underrepresented outsiders lacking a 
collective experience of socio-economic predicament may turn to populist 
right-wing alternatives, while a large group of marginalised outsiders may 
very well mobilise a left-wing populist reaction.  
However, a two-case research design begs the question of generalisability. 
After all, Europe has witnessed the rise of many and explicitly different 
populist parties in recent years. Can our theory explain these equally?  
The cases of Italy and Greece seem to suggest so. Italy saw a major labour 
market reform in 2012 (Fornero Reform), which similar to its Spanish sibling was 
designed to address dualism by reducing EPL for permanent contracts through 
reduced dismissal costs. However, these measures did not improve 
employment levels, but rather increased the number of atypical and irregular 
contracts in the context of an overall worsening fiscal crisis and strict austerity 
(Piazza and Myant, 2015). An immediate political consequence was observable 
in the general elections of 2013, when Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement won 
the popular vote. This newly established party focuses on environmental and 
social protection, hence seems to follow a rather left-wing agenda, but also 
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shows clear signs of typical populist fashion, most importantly an urge to 
regain agency for an underrepresented constituency. In this sense, the party 
showed a special capacity to represent issues that were seen as both urgent and 
not covered by large parts of the Italian electorate and was thus able to “create 
an ideological profile of purposeful opposition to the socio-economic status 
quo” (Conti and Memoli, 2015: 531), while applying a politically-charged 
populist discourse. 
In Greece, too, austere labour market reforms paired with general social 
regression and a staggering economic crisis created fertile ground for a socially-
progressive reaction. Various labour market reforms since 2010 introduced an 
extension of flexible work, severe reductions and ceilings of unemployment 
benefits and general social protection, and the deregulation of collective 
bargaining institutions. The measures increased temporary and part-time 
employment, aggravated long-term unemployment, and led to a 
comprehensive corrosion of worker representation and nominal wages in both 
the private and public sector (ETUI, 2018). These reforms, as part of extensive 
austerity efforts, created a strong basis for left-wing populist party Syriza that 
in its structure and objectives appears very similar to its Spanish sister Podemos. 
Thus, while in both cases radical right-wing parties gained ground as well due 
to an apparently less dismissive relationship with political fascism, in both 
instances it was progressive left-wing parties that gained vast electoral support. 
On the other hand, the rise of far-right populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 
may also be explained with the model developed here. Since the early 2000s, 
EPL for temporary and permanent employment diverges significantly, while 
the employment rate has increased steadily even throughout the high point of 
the global financial crisis. Austria thus resembles the German case in important 
respects, although the FPÖ enjoys much more political acceptance than AfD 
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and even obtained governmental responsibilities after achieving close to 26 
percent of total votes in the legislative elections of 2017. 
In this light, my findings should serve as a general reminder that labour market 
reforms can bring unequal social hardship and imply sobering consequences 
for political stability and social cohesion. It is, however, very difficult to 
establish and proof empirical causality between actual populist voting and the 
generalisability of socio-economic decline. This is especially due to the 
persistent lack of long-term data needed to connect politico-economic with 
electoral analyses. As seen in the case of Germany, socio-economic issues can 
simmer under the surface for quite some time until suddenly a triggering event 
opens a window of opportunity for right-wing populist protest. Further studies 
should therefore aim at improving the data situation regarding socio-economic 
variables and voting behaviour among outsiders to further empirically test the 
generalisability of my findings and theoretical assumptions. 
Finally, I would like to venture some political implications with regards to my 
results. This study exemplifies that a differentiated analysis of the underlying 
motivations of populist demand is imperative. While anti-pluralist sentiments 
are a real threat to democracy and hence unjustifiable indifferent of anyone’s 
socio-economic background, populist demand, if analysed thoroughly, can also 
serve as an ‘alarm signal for dysfunction in the representative political system’ 
(Cuperus, 2003: 106) and as an indicator of political underrepresentation. In this 
sense, a constructive approach to tackling populism must rediscover the 
powers of labour market institutions in mitigating the adverse effects of 
structural economic and social transformations (Vlandas and Halikiopoulou, 
2016) and thus puts the European left under significant pressure to act. 
However, in the ‘frozen’ landscape of European welfare states with social 
policy in budgetary gridlock, bridging insider and outsider interests is a very 
difficult task to achieve (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 24). The same dilemma 
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remains pertinent for newly-established left-wing parties when assuming 
political responsibility as the recent fall of Podemos’ support at general 
elections exemplifies. The European left seems entrapped in the classical 
problem of failing to meet expectations – and in an environment of political 
alienation expectations are high. But an effective attempt to counteracting 
populist resentments requires a bold return to increased social solidarity and 
redistribution to re-address the justifiable grievances of a temporarily 
underrepresented core electorate. Most importantly, this entails formulating a 
distinct alternative to the evermore prominent notion that internal devaluation 
and a reduction of EPL is the best practice to address lack of flexibility and 
dualisms in European labour markets.  
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Dustin Voss 
 
 42 
Lindvall, Johannes and David Rueda (2014): ‘The Insider-Outsider Dilemma’, British 
Journal of Political Science 44(2): 460-475. 
Lunz, Patrick (2013): “What's left of the left? Partisanship and the political economy of labour market reform: why has the social democratic party in Germany liberalised 
labour markets?” LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 65/2013. Martin, Cathie Jo and Duane Swank (2012): The Political Construction of Business Interests: 
Coordination, Growth, and Equality. Cambridge: CUP. 
Mudde, Cas (2004): ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition 39(4): 542-563.  
Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2013): ‘Populism’, pp. 493-512 in Michael Freeden and Marc Stears (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2011): ‘Voices of the Peoples: Populism in 
Europe and Latin America Compared’, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Working Paper No. 378 (July 2011). Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University.  Müller, Jan-Werner (2017): ‘Populists cannot win on their own’, Financial Times (online), 8 February 2017. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/69295304-ea34-11e6-967b-c88452263daf?mhq5j=e4 (Accessed: 6 August 2017).  Müller, Jan-Werner (2016): What is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Nachtwey, Oliver (2016): Die Abstiegsgesellschaft: Über das Aufbegehren in der regressiven 
Moderne. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Odendahl, Christian (2017): ‘The Hartz myth: A closer look at Germany’s labour market 
reforms’, Centre for European Reform, July 2017, London. OECD (2017a): OECD Data: Germany and Spain. URL: https://data.oecd.org (Accessed: 20 July 2017).  OECD (2017b): Strictness of Employment Protection, URL: http://stats.oecd.org/ Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EPL_R# (Accessed: 20 July 2017).  OECD (2017c): Real GDP forecast (indicator). doi: 10.1787/1f84150b-en (Accessed: 20 July 2017). OECD (2017d): Incidence of Involuntary Part Time Workers. URL: https://stats .oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=INVPT_I# (Accessed: 20 July 2017).  OECD (2013): The 2012 Labour Market Reforms in Spain: A Preliminary Assessment. December 2013, Paris. 
Orsini, Kristian (2014): ‘Wage adjustment in Spain: slow, inefficient and unfair?’, ECFIN 
Country Focus 11(10), European Commission.  
Palier, Bruno and Kathleen Thelen (2010): ‘Institutionalizing Dualism: 
Complementarities and Change in France and Germany’, Politics & Society 38(1): 119-148.  
Piazza, Gabriele and Martin Myant (2015): ‘Italy’s labour market reforms of 2012: did 
they reduce unemployment?’, ETUI Working Paper 2015.11. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute.  
Pontusson, Jonas and David Rueda (2010): ‘The politics of inequality: Voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states’, Comparative Political Studies 43(6): 675-705.  
The Political Economy of European Populism 
 43 
Rhodes, Martin (2013): ‘Labour Markets, Welfare States and the Dilemmas of European 
Social Democracy’, pp. 140-155 in Micheal Keating and David McCrone (eds.) The Crisis 
of Social Democracy in Europe. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
Rinne, Ulf, and Klaus F. Zimmermann (2012): ‘Another Economic Miracle? The German 
Labor Market and the Great Recession’, IZA Journal of Labor Policy 1(3). 
Romanos, Eduardo (2016): ‘Late Neoliberalism and Its Indignados: Contention in 
Austerity Spain’, pp. 131-167 in Donatella della Porta, Massimiliano Andretta, Thiago 
Fernandes, Francis O’Connor, Eduardo Romanos, and Markos Vogiatzoglou (eds.) Late 
Neoliberalism and its Discontents in the Economic Crisis. London: Palgrave McMilliam. Rueda, David (2007): Social Democracy Inside Out: Partisanship and Labor Market Policy 
in Industrialized Democracies. Oxford; New York: OUP. 
Rueda, David (2005): ‘Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties’, The American Political Science Review 99(1): 61-74. Runciman, Walter G. (1966): Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of attitudes to 
social inequality in twentieth century England. London: Routledge & Keagan Paul.  
Rydgren, Jens (2007): ‘The Sociology of the Radical Right’, Annual Review of Sociology 33: 241-262. 
Sandel, Michael J. (2017): ‘Lessons from the Populist Revolt’, Project Syndicate (online), 4 January 2017, URL: https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/ lessons-from-the-populist-revolt-by-michael-sandel-2017-01?barrier=accessyef (Accessed: 27 July 2017) 
Sauer, Stefan (2017): ‘Arbeiter stimmen kaum für die SPD’, Frankfurter Rundschau 
(online), 19 July 2017, URL: http://www.fr.de/politik/bundestagswahl/ waehlerverhalten-arbeiter-stimmen-kaum-fuer-die-spd-a-1316647 (Accessed: 29 July 2017).  Sniderman, Paul M. and Louk Hagendoorn (2007): When Ways of Life Collide. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Sola, Jorge and César Rendueles (2017): ‘Podemos, the upheaval of Spanish politics and 
the challenge of populism’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2017.1304899.  
Stanley, Ben (2008): ‘The Thin Ideology of Populism.’ Journal of Political Ideologies 13(1): 95-110. 
Streeck, Wolfgang (2017): ‘The Return of the Repressed’, New Left Review 104 (March/April 2017): 5-18. 
Tagesschau (2017): ‘Landtagswahlen und Bundesrat’, Wahlmonitor Tagesschau (online). URL: https://wahl.tagesschau.de/landtag.shtml (Accessed: 1 August 2017).  Thelen, Kathleen (2014): Varieties of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social 
Solidarity. New York, NY: CUP.  Transparency International (2017): Corruption Perceptions Index. URL: https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (Accessed: 20 July 2017).  Unión General de Trabajadores (2014): Dos Años de Reforma Laboral: Evolución del 
Empleo, la Contratación, los Despidos y la Negociación Colectiva. 7 February 2014, Madrid. 
Dustin Voss 
 
 44 
Vlandas, Tim and Daphne Halikiopoulou (2016): ‘Why far right parties do well at times of 
crisis: the role of labour market institutions’, European Trade Union Institute, Working Paper 2016.07, Brussels. 
Vlandas, Tim and Daphne Halikiopoulou (2015): ‘Risks, Costs and Labour Markets: Explaining Cross-National Patterns of Far-Right Party Success in European Parliament 
Elections’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(3): 636-655. White, Jonathan (2017): Brexit, populism and the promise of agency. URL: https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/jonathan-white/brexitpopul ism-and-promise-of-agency (Accessed: 13 March 2017). 
Wolf, Martin (2017): ‘The Economic Origins of the Populist Surge’, Financial Times 
(online). June 27, 2017. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/5557f806-5a75-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b?sectionid=comment (Accessed: 14 July 2017). 
Zarzalejos, Javier (2016): ‘Populism in Spain: an analysis of Podemos’, European View 15: 183-191.                                     
 
The Political Economy of European Populism 
 45 
Recent LEQS papers 
  
Campos, Nauro F. & Macchiarelli, Corrado “Symmetry and Convergence in Monetary Unions” LEQS 
Paper No. 131, March 2018 
 
Costa Font, Joan & Perdikis, Laurie 'Varieties of Health Care Devolution: "Systems or Federacies"?' LEQS 
Paper No. 130, February 2018 
 
Calrsson, Ulrika “The Perennial Thirty Years’ War” LEQS Paper No. 129, February 2018 
 
Isiksel, Turkuler “Square peg, round hole: Why the EU can’t fix identity politics” LEQS Paper No. 128, 
January 2018 
 
Hancké, Robert & Vlandas, Tim “The Politics of Disinflation” LEQS Paper No. 127, December 2017 
 
White, Jonathan “Between Rules and Discretion: Thoughts on Ordo-liberalism” LEQS Paper No. 126, 
November 2017 
 
Costa Font, Joan & Zigante, Valentina “Building ‘Implicit Partnerships’? Financial Long Term Care 
Entitlements in Europe” LEQS Paper No. 125, October 2017 
 
Bohle, Dorothee “Mortgaging Europe's periphery” LEQS Paper No. 124, September 2017 
 
Iordanoglou, Chrysafis & Matsaganis, Manos “Why Grexit cannot save Greece (but staying in the Euro 
area might)” LEQS Paper No. 123, August 2017 
 
Saka, Orkun “'Domestic banks as lightning rods? Home bias during the Eurozone crisis” LEQS Paper No. 
122, February 2017 
 
Coulter, Steve “Signalling Moderation: UK Trade Unions, ‘New Labour’ and the Single Currency” LEQS 
Paper No. 121, December 2016 
   
Di Cataldo, Marco “Gaining and losing EU Objective 1 funds: Regional development in Britain and the 
prospect of Brexit” LEQS Paper No. 120, November 2016 
 
Avlijas, Sonja “Vicious and virtuous cycles of female labour force participation in post-socialist Eastern 
Europe” LEQS Paper No. 119, November 2016 
 
Crescenzi, Riccardo & Iammarino, Simona. “Global Investments and Regional Development Trajectories: 
the Missing Links” LEQS Paper No. 118, October 2016 
 
Teasdale, Anthony. “The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle’s Intergovernmental Design for Europe” LEQS Paper 
No. 117, October 2016 
 
Campos, Nauro F. & Macchiarelli, Corrado. “Core and Periphery in the European Monetary Union: 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen 25 Years Later” LEQS Paper No. 116, September 2016 
 
Foresti, Pasquale & Napolitano, Oreste. “On the Stock Markets’ Reactions to Taxation and Public 
Expenditure” LEQS Paper No. 115, September 2016 
 
Gelepithis, Margarita. “Rethinking the paradox of redistribution: how private insurance and means 
testing can lead to universalizing reform” LEQS Paper No. 114, July 2016 
 
Costa-Font, Joan & Turati, Gilberto. “Regional Health Care Decentralization in Unitary States: Equal 
Spending, Equal Satisfaction?” LEQS Paper No. 113, June 2016 
Dustin Voss 
 
 46 
 
LEQS 
European Institute 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE London 
Email: euroinst.LEQS@lse.ac.uk  
 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/Home.aspx   
 
 
 
